The economic structure of corporate law
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
The economic structure of corporate law
Harvard University Press, 1996
- : pbk
Available at / 38 libraries
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National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies Library (GRIPS Library)
: pbk325.953||E1101085984
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Note
"First Harvard University Press paperback edition, 1996" -- T.p. verso
Includes bibliographical references and indexes
Description and Table of Contents
Description
The authors argue that the rules and practices of corporate law mimic contractual provisions that parties would reach if they bargained about every contingency at zero cost and flawlessly enforced their agreements. But bargaining and enforcement are costly, and corporate law provides the rules and an enforcement mechanism that govern relations among those who commit their capital to such ventures. The authors work out the reasons for supposing that this is the exclusive function of corporate law and the implications of this perspective.
Table of Contents
* The Corporate Contract * Limited Liability * Voting * The Fiduciary Principle, the Business Judgment Rule, and the Derivative Suit * Corporate Control Transactions * The Appraisal Remedy * Tender Offers * The Incorporation Debate and State Antitakeover Statutes * Close Corporations * Trading on Inside Information * Mandatory Disclosure * Optimal Damages * Acknowledgments * Case Index * Author Index * General Index
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