Strong managers, weak owners : the political roots of American corporate finance
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Strong managers, weak owners : the political roots of American corporate finance
（Princeton paperbacks）
Princeton University Press, 1996, c1994
- : pbk
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Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. [289]-308) and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
In this major reinterpretation of the evolution of the American corporation, Mark Roe convincingly demonstrates that the ownership structure of large U.S. firms owes its distinctive character as much to politics as to economics and technology. His provocative examination addresses essential issues facing American businesses today as they compete in the new international marketplace.
Table of Contents
PrefaceIntroductionPt. IThe Economic Paradigm1Ch. 1Diffuse Ownership as Natural Economic Evolution3Ch. 2Fragmentation's Costs9Pt. IIThe Political Paradigm19Ch. 3Diffuse Ownership as Political Product21Ch. 4A Political Theory26Pt. IIIThe Historical Evidence51Ch. 5Banks54Ch. 6Insurers60Ch. 7Banks Again94Ch. 8Mutual Funds102Ch. 9Pension Funds124Pt. IVThe Contemporary and Comparative Evidence147Ch. 10Takeovers151Ch. 11Corporate Ownership in Germany and Japan169Ch. 12A Small Comparative Test of the Political Theory187Ch. 13Counterpoint I198Ch. 14Political Evolution in Germany and Japan?210Ch. 15Trends in the United States222Ch. 16An American Crossroads226Pt. VPolicy Recommendations231Ch. 17Managers as the Problem?235Ch. 18Short-Term Finance as the Problem?240Ch. 19Industrial Organization as the Problem?248Ch. 20Counterpoint II254Ch. 21Changing the American Ownership Structure?263Conclusion283Bibliography289Acknowledgments309Index311
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