Useful adversaries : grand strategy, domestic mobilization, and Sino-American conflict, 1947-1958
著者
書誌事項
Useful adversaries : grand strategy, domestic mobilization, and Sino-American conflict, 1947-1958
（Princeton studies in international history and politics）
Princeton University Press, c1996
- : hbk
- : pbk
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注記
Bibliography: p. [277]-303
Includes index
内容説明・目次
- 巻冊次
-
: pbk ISBN 9780691026374
内容説明
This book provides a new analysis of why relations between the United States and the Chinese Communists were so hostile in the first decade of the Cold War. Employing extensive documentation, it offers a fresh approach to long-debated questions such as why Truman refused to recognize the Chinese Communists, why the United States aided Chiang Kai-shek's KMT on Taiwan, why the Korean War escalated into a Sino-American conflict, and why Mao shelled islands in the Taiwan Straits in 1958, thus sparking a major crisis with the United States. Christensen first develops a novel two-level approach that explains why leaders manipulate low-level conflicts to mobilize popular support for expensive, long-term security strategies. By linking "grand strategy," domestic politics, and the manipulation of ideology and conflict, Christensen provides a nuanced and sophisticated link between domestic politics and foreign policy. He then applies the approach to Truman's policy toward the Chinese Communists in 1947-50 and to Mao's initiation of the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis.
In these cases the extension of short-term conflict was useful in gaining popular support for the overall grand strategy that each leader was promoting domestically: Truman's limited-containment strategy toward the USSR and Mao's self-strengthening programs during the Great Leap Forward. Christensen also explores how such low-level conflicts can escalate, as they did in Korea, despite leaders' desire to avoid actual warfare.
目次
List of Figures and TablesPrefaceNote on Translation and RomanizationCh. 1Introduction3Ch. 2Grand Strategy, National Political Power, and Two-Level Foreign Policy Analysis11Ch. 3Moderate Strategies and Crusading Rhetoric: Truman Mobilizes for a Bipolar World32Ch. 4Absent at the Creation: Acheson's Decision to Forgo Relations with the Chinese Communists77Ch. 5The Real Lost Chance in China: Nonrecognition, Taiwan, and the Disaster at the Yalu138Ch. 6Continuing Conflict over Taiwan: Mao, the Great Leap Forward, and the 1958 Quemoy Crisis194Ch. 7Conclusion242App. AAmerican Public Opinion Polls, 1947-1950263App. BMao's Korean War Telegrams271Bibliography277Index305
- 巻冊次
-
: hbk ISBN 9780691026381
内容説明
This book provides a new analysis of why relations between the United States and the Chinese Communists were so hostile in the first decade of the Cold War. Employing extensive documentation, it offers a fresh approach to long-debated questions such as why Truman refused to recognize the Chinese Communists, why the United States aided Chiang Kai-shek's KMT on Taiwan, why the Korean War escalated into a Sino-American conflict, and why Mao shelled islands in the Taiwan Straits in 1958, thus sparking a major crisis with the United States.
Christensen first develops a novel two-level approach that explains why leaders manipulate low-level conflicts to mobilize popular support for expensive, long-term security strategies. By linking "grand strategy," domestic politics, and the manipulation of ideology and conflict, Christensen provides a nuanced and sophisticated link between domestic politics and foreign policy. He then applies the approach to Truman's policy toward the Chinese Communists in 1947-50 and to Mao's initiation of the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis. In these cases the extension of short-term conflict was useful in gaining popular support for the overall grand strategy that each leader was promoting domestically: Truman's limited-containment strategy toward the USSR and Mao's self-strengthening programs during the Great Leap Forward. Christensen also explores how such low-level conflicts can escalate, as they did in Korea, despite leaders' desire to avoid actual warfare.
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