The outbreak of the First World War : strategic planning, crisis decision making, and deterrence failure
著者
書誌事項
The outbreak of the First World War : strategic planning, crisis decision making, and deterrence failure
（Praeger studies in diplomacy and strategic thought）
Praeger, 1995
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注記
Bibliography: p. [135]-145
Includes index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
This study examines what led the leaders of Austria-Hungary and Germany to launch major military offensives at the beginning of the First World War. The focus is on understanding why these two countries adopted high-risk offensive strategies during an international confrontation rather than a defensive military stance. The decision to attack or defend did not occur in a political vacuum. The leaders of Austria-Hungary and Germany adopted offensive strategies as a way to achieve their political ambitions. The offensives undertaken by Austria-Hungary and Germany in 1914 thus reflected their political goals as well as the strategic doctrines of war planners. The concluding chapter of this study explores why deterrence failed in 1914.
目次
- Acknowledgments Abbreviations Introduction War Planning The Short War Dogma Austria-Hungary's War Plans Prewar Military Collaboration between Austria-Hungary and Germany The July Crisis A Terrorist Attack in Sarajevo
- Austria-Hungary and Germany Decide for War Russia's Decision for War Vienna and Berlin Order General Mobilization East or West in Germany's Deployment Britain's Decision for War Conclusion: Why Deterrence Failed in 1914 Appendix I: Austria-Hungary's Mobilization Calendar Appendix II: Tabular Overview of the Movement of the "B"-Staffel in 1914 Appendix III: Staabs' Deployment East Bibliography Index
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