Lingua universalis vs. calculus ratiocinator : an ultimate presupposition of twentieth-century philosophy
著者
書誌事項
Lingua universalis vs. calculus ratiocinator : an ultimate presupposition of twentieth-century philosophy
(Jaakko Hintikka selected papers, v. 2)
Kluwer Academic Publishers, c1997
- タイトル別名
-
Lingua universalis versus calculus ratiocinator
大学図書館所蔵 全24件
  青森
  岩手
  宮城
  秋田
  山形
  福島
  茨城
  栃木
  群馬
  埼玉
  千葉
  東京
  神奈川
  新潟
  富山
  石川
  福井
  山梨
  長野
  岐阜
  静岡
  愛知
  三重
  滋賀
  京都
  大阪
  兵庫
  奈良
  和歌山
  鳥取
  島根
  岡山
  広島
  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
  宮崎
  鹿児島
  沖縄
  韓国
  中国
  タイ
  イギリス
  ドイツ
  スイス
  フランス
  ベルギー
  オランダ
  スウェーデン
  ノルウェー
  アメリカ
注記
Includes bibliographical references
内容説明・目次
内容説明
R. G. Collingwood saw one of the main tasks of philosophers and of historians of human thought in uncovering what he called the ultimate presuppositions of different thinkers, of different philosophical movements and of entire eras of intellectual history. He also noted that such ultimate presuppositions usually remain tacit at first, and are discovered only by subsequent reflection. Collingwood would have been delighted by the contrast that constitutes the overall theme of the essays collected in this volume. Not only has this dichotomy ofviews been one ofthe mostcrucial watersheds in the entire twentieth-century philosophical thought. Not only has it remained largely implicit in the writings of the philosophers for whom it mattered most. It is a truly Collingwoodian presupposition also in that it is not apremise assumed by different thinkers in their argumentation. It is the presupposition of a question, an assumption to the effect that a certain general question can be raised and answered. Its role is not belied by the fact that several philosophers who answered it one way or the other seem to be largely unaware that the other answer also makes sense - if it does. This Collingwoodian question can be formulated in a first rough approximation by asking whether language - our actual working language, Tarski's "colloquiallanguage" - is universal in the sense of being inescapable. This formulation needs all sorts of explanations, however.
目次
1. Contemporary Philosophy and the Problem of Truth. 2. Is Truth Ineffable? 3. Defining Truth, the Whole Truth and Nothing but the Truth. 4. On the Development of the Model-Theoretic Viewpoint in Logical Theory. 5. The Place of C.S. Peirce in the History of Logical Theory. 6. Wittgenstein and Language as the Universal Medium. 7. Carnap's Work in the Foundations of Logic and Mathematics in a Historical Perspective. 8. Quine as a Member of the Tradition of the Universality of Language. Appendices.
「Nielsen BookData」 より