The challenger launch decision : risky technology, culture, and deviance at NASA

著者

書誌事項

The challenger launch decision : risky technology, culture, and deviance at NASA

Diane Vaughan

University of Chicago Press, 1997

Paperback ed

  • : pbk

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注記

Bibliography: p. 533-550

Includes index

内容説明・目次

内容説明

When the Space Shuttle Challenger exploded on January 28, 1986, millions of Americans became bound together in a single, historic moment. Many still vividly remember exactly where they were and what they were doing when they heard about the tragedy. In "The Challenger Launch Decision," Diane Vaughan recreates the steps leading up to that fateful decision, contradicting conventional interpretations to prove that what occurred at NASA was not skulduggery or misconduct but a disastrous mistake. Journalists and investigators have historically cited production problems and managerial wrong-doing as the reasons behind the disaster. The Presidential Commission uncovered a flawed decision-making process at the space agency as well, citing a well-documented history of problems with the O-ring and a dramatic last-minute protest by engineers over the Solid Rocket Boosters as evidence of managerial neglect. Why did NASA managers, who not only had all the information prior to the launch but also were warned against it, decide to proceed? In retelling how the decision unfolded through the eyes of the managers and the engineers, Vaughan uncovers an incremental descent into poor judgment, supported by a culture of high-risk technology. She reveals how and why NASA insiders, when repeatedly faced with evidence that something was wrong, normalized the deviance so that it became acceptable to them. No safety rules were broken. No single individual was at fault. Instead, the cause of the disaster is a story not of evil but of the banality of organizational life. This work seeks to explain why the Challenger tragedy must be re-examined and offers an warning about the hidden hazards of living in this technological age.

目次

  • he Eve of the Launch
  • Learning Culture, Revising History
  • Risk, Work Group Culture, and the Norma lization of Deviance
  • The Normalization of Deviance, 1981-1984
  • The Normalization of Deviance, 19856: The Culture of Production
  • St ructural Secrecy
  • The Eve of the Launch Revisited
  • Conformity and Tragedy
  • Lessons Learned Appendix A Cost/Safety Trade-Offs? Scra pping the Escape Rockets and the SRB Contract Award Decision. Appendix B Supporting Charts and Documents
  • Appendix C On Theory Elaboration, Organizations, and Historical Ethnography.

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