From instrumentalism to constructive realism : on some relations between confirmation, empirical progress, and truth approximation
著者
書誌事項
From instrumentalism to constructive realism : on some relations between confirmation, empirical progress, and truth approximation
(Synthese library, v. 287)
Kluwer Academic, c2000
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注記
Includes bibliographical references and indexes
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Surprisingly, modified versions of the confirmation theory (Carnap and Hempel) and truth approximation theory (Popper) turn out to be smoothly sythesizable. The glue between the two appears to be the instrumentalist methodology, rather than that of the falsificationalist.
The instrumentalist methodology, used in the separate, comparative evaluation of theories in terms of their successes and problems (hence, even if already falsified), provides in theory and practice the straight road to short-term empirical progress in science ( a la Laudan). It is also argued that such progress is also functional for all kinds of truth approximation: observational, referential, and theoretical. This sheds new light on the long-term dynamics of science and hence on the relation between the main epistemological positions, viz., instrumentalism (Toulmin, Laudan), constructive empiricism (Van Fraassen), referential realism (Hacking, Cartwright), and theory realism of a non-essentialist nature (constructive realism a la Popper).
Readership: Open minded philosophers and scientists. The book explains and justifies the scientist's intuition that the debate among philosophers about instrumentalism and realism has almost no practical consequences.
目次
Foreword. 1. General Introduction: Epistemological Positions. Part I: Confirmation. 2. Confirmation by the HD-Method. 3. Quantitative Confirmation, and its Qualitative Consequences. 4. Inductive Confirmation and Inductive Logic. Part II: Empirical Progress. 5. Separate Evaluation of Theories by the HD-Method. 6. Empirical Progress and Pseudoscience. Part III: Basic Truth Approximation. 7. Truthlikeness and Truth Approximation. 8. Intuitions of Scientists and Philosophers. 9. Epistemological Stratification of Nomic Truth Approximation. Part IV: Refined Truth Approximation. 10. Refinement of Nomic Truth Approximation. 11. Examples of Potential Truth Approximation. 12. Quantitative Truthlikeness and Truth Approximation. 13. Conclusion: Constructive Realism. Notes. References. Index of Names. Index of Subjects.
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