The economics of international environmental agreements
著者
書誌事項
The economics of international environmental agreements
(International library of environmental economics and policy)
Ashgate, c2000
- : hard
大学図書館所蔵 全57件
  青森
  岩手
  宮城
  秋田
  山形
  福島
  茨城
  栃木
  群馬
  埼玉
  千葉
  東京
  神奈川
  新潟
  富山
  石川
  福井
  山梨
  長野
  岐阜
  静岡
  愛知
  三重
  滋賀
  京都
  大阪
  兵庫
  奈良
  和歌山
  鳥取
  島根
  岡山
  広島
  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
  宮崎
  鹿児島
  沖縄
  韓国
  中国
  タイ
  イギリス
  ドイツ
  スイス
  フランス
  ベルギー
  オランダ
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注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Conflicts between developed and developing countries over global environmental problems, and the fact that the co-operation required to solve environmental collective action problems is typically elusive in the world of international relations, suggests a research agenda regarding how one might hop to bring about co-operation in an inherently non-co-operative international setting. In particular, what can economic theory tell us about the design of international environmental agreements (IEAs) that will protect the world's fragile environmental resources? This book collects work on IEAs which demonstrates the value of rigorous microeconomic and econometric modelling in comprehending the many and varied facets of the design and implementation in IEAs.
目次
- The problem of global environmental protection, Scott Barrett
- global environmental problems - the effects of unilateral actions taken by one country, Michael Hoel
- creating a good atmosphere - minimum participation for tackling the greenhouse effect, Jane Black, M. Levi and D. De Meza
- Strategies for the international protection of the environment, Carlo Carraro and D. Siniscalco
- self-enforcing international environmental agreements, Scott Barrett
- environmental consciousness and moral hazard in international agreements to protect the environment, Emmanuel Petrakis and A. Xepapadeas
- negotiating an agreement on global warning - a theoretical analysis, Zhiqu Chen
- the effects of collusion and limited liability on the design of international environmental agreements for developing countries, Amit Batabyal
- political institutions and pollution control, roger D. Congleton
- efficiency and distribution in greenhouse negotiations, Johan Eyckmans, S. Proost and E. Schokkaert
- a Finnish-Soviet acid rain game - non-co-operative equilibria, cost efficient and sulphur agreements, Olli Tahvonen, V. Kaitala and M. Phojola
- voluntary provision of a public good - results from a real world experiment, Werher W. Pommerehne, Lars P. Feld adn A. hart
- the voluntary provision of a pure public good - the case of reduced CFC emissions and the Montreal Protocol, James C. Murdoch and T. Sandler
- a tale of two collectives - sulphur versus nitrogen oxides emission reduction in Europe, James C. Murdoch, T. Sandler and K. Sargent.
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