Auction theory
著者
書誌事項
Auction theory
Academic Press, c2002
大学図書館所蔵 全81件
注記
Bibliography: p. [289]-297
Includes index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Auction Theory is the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions. The book develops the main concepts of auction theory from scratch in a self-contained and theoretically rigorous manner. It explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information through detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory.
This book complements its superb presentation of auction theory with clear and concise proofs of all results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization. It provides discussions on auction-related subjects, including private value auctions; the Revenue Equivalence Principle; auctions with interdependent values; the Revenue Ranking (Linkage) Principle; mechanism design with interdependent values; bidding rings; multiple object auctions; equilibrium and efficiency with private values; and nonidentical objects.
This book is essential reading for graduate students taking courses on auction theory, the economics of information, or the economics of incentives, as well as for any serious student of auctions. It will also appeal to professional economists or business analysts working in contract theory, experimental economics, industrial organization, and microeconomic theory.
目次
- Private Value Auctions
- The Revenue Equivalence Principle
- Qualifications and Extensions
- Mechanism Design
- Auctions with Interdependent Values
- The Revenue Ranking ("Linkage") Principle
- Asymmetries and Other Complications
- Efficiency and the English Auction
- Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values
- Bidding Rings
- An Introduction to Multiple Object Auctions
- Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values
- Some Revenue Considerations
- Sequential Sales
- Nonidentical Objects
- Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values
- Appendices: Continuous Distributions' Stochastic Orders
- Order Statistics
- Affiliated Random Variables
- Some Linear Algebra
- Games of Incomplete Information
- Existence of Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions.
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