Economics and liability for environmental problems
著者
書誌事項
Economics and liability for environmental problems
(International library of environmental economics and policy)
Ashgate : Dartmouth, c2002
大学図書館所蔵 全42件
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注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
This convenient reference brings together notable contributions examining all aspects of the liability for environmental accidents. Articles included in the Part I of this volume examine the role of liability as a policy instrument, and provide detailed examinations of the incentive effects created by the imposition of liability, ie. Bankruptcy, litigation costs, delegation of responsibility and insurance. Those in Part II study specific environmental issues such as hazardous waste disposal and oil spills. The International Library of Environmental Economics and Policy explores the influence of economics on the development of environmental and natural resource policy. In a series of twenty five volumes, the most significant journal essays in key areas of the contemporary environmental and resource policy are collected. This convenient reference brings together the notable contributions examining all aspects of the liability for environmental accidents.
目次
- Part 1 Theory: the role of liability - property rules, liability rules and alienability - one view of the cathedral, Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, liability for harm versus regulation of safety, Steven Shavell, a comparison of taxes, regulation and liability rules under imperfect information, Michele J. White, a model of the optimal use of liability and safety regulation, Steven Shavell
- incentive effects of liability - strict liability vs. negligence, Steven Shavell, strict liability vs. negligence in a market setting, A. Mitchell Polinsky, when does the rule of liability matter?, Harold Demsetz, strict liability in a principal-agent model, Harry A. Newman and David W. Wright, on liability and insurance, Steven Shavell, the influence of litigation costs on deterrence under strict liability and negligence, Keith N. Hylton, bankruptcy and care choice, T.R. Beard, tort law as a regulatory regime for catastrophic personal injuries, William Landes and Richard Posner. Part 2 Applications: conceptual models - the effects of environmental liability on industrial real estate development, James Boyd et al, lender penalty for environmental damage and the equilibrium cost of capital, Anthony Heyes, sharing damages among multiple tortfeasors, Lewis A. Kornhauser and Richard L. Pevesz, indivisible toxic torts - the economics of joint and several liability, Tom H. Tietenberg, liability for groundwater contamination from pesticides, Kathleen Segerson, the structure of penalties in environmental enforcement - an economic analysis, Kathleen Segerson and Tom Tietenberg
- empirical models -controlling stochastic pollution events through liability rules -some evidence from OCS leasing, James J. Opaluch and Thomas A. Grigalunas, premiums for environmental liability - does superfund increase the cost of capital?, Steven Garber and James K. Hammitt, strict liability as a deterrent in toxic waste management -empirical evidence from accident and spill data, Anna Alberini and David Austin, liability and large-scale, long-term hazards, A.H. Ringleb and Steven N. Wiggins
- liability reform - environmental liability reform and privatization in central and eastern Europe, James Boyd, economic models of compensation for damage caused by nuclear accidents - some lessons for the revision of the Paris and Vienna Conventions, Michael Faure.
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