Introduction to the theory of cooperative games
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Introduction to the theory of cooperative games
（Theory and decision library, ser. C . Game theory,
Kluwer Academic Publishers, c2003
- : pbk
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Note
Bibliography: p. 357-369
Includes indexes
Description and Table of Contents
- Volume
-
ISBN 9781402074103
Description
Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games systematically studies the main solutions of cooperative games: the core, bargaining set, kernel, nucleolus, and the Shapley value of TU games, and the core, the Shapley value, and the ordinal bargaining set of NTU games. To each solution a separate chapter is devoted, in which its properties are investigated in full detail. Moreover, important variants are defined or even intensively analyzed. Separate chapters cover continuity, dynamics, and geometric properties of solutions of TU games. This study culminates in uniform and coherent axiomatizations of all the foregoing solutions (excluding the bargaining set). Except for the Shapley value such axiomatizations have not appeared in any book. Moreover, Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games contains a detailed analysis of the main results on cooperative games without side payments. Such analysis is very limited or non-existent in the existing literature on game theory. This book is of interest to Game Theorists, Economists, Mathematicians and Researchers in Operations Research, Political Science and Social Science.
- Volume
-
: pbk ISBN 9781402077845
Description
"Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games" systematically studies the main solutions of cooperative games: the core, bargaining set, kernel, nucleolus, and the Shapley value of TU games, and the core, the Shapley value, and the ordinal bargaining set of NTU games. To each solution, a separate chapter is devoted, in which its properties are investigated in full detail. Moreover, important variants are defined or even intensively analyzed. Separate chapters cover continuity, dynamics, and geometric properties of solutions of TU games. This study culminates in uniform and coherent axiomatizations of all the foregoing solutions (excluding the bargaining set). Except for the Shapley value such axiomatizations have not appeared in any book. Moreover, "Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games" contains a detailed analysis of the main results on cooperative games without side payments. Such analysis is very limited or non-existent in the existing literature on game theory.
by "Nielsen BookData"