A constitution for the European Union

Author(s)

• Blankart, Charles Beat
• Mueller, Dennis C.

Bibliographic Information

A constitution for the European Union

edited by Charles B. Blankart and Dennis C. Mueller

（The CESifo seminar series / Hans-Werner Sinn, editor）

MIT Press, c2004

• : hc

Note

Includes bibliographical references and index

Contents of Works

• The European constitution and peace : taking the heat out of politics / Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin
• Competitive federalism by default / James M. Buchanan
• The assignment of powers in an open-ended European Union / Pierre Salmon
• Rights and citizenship in the European Union / Dennis C. Mueller
• Enlargements and the principles of designing EU decision-making procedures / Mika Widgrén
• The deadlock of the EU budget : an economic analysis of ways in and ways out / Charles B. Blankart and Christian Kirchner
• Coordinating sectoral policy-making : searching for countervailing mechanisms in the EU legislative process / Bernard Steunenberg
• How to choose the European executive : a counterfactual analysis, 1979-1999 / Simon Hix, Abdul Noury, and Gérard Roland
• The role of direct democracy in the European Union / Lars P. Feld and Gebhard Kirchgässner
• Brining the European Union closer to its citizens : conclusions from the conference / Charles B. Blankart and Dennis C. Mueller

Description and Table of Contents

Description

International economists and other scholars address the major issues that arise in writing a European constitution, including the evolution of federalism and the role of direct democracy. The leaders of European Union member states have declared that a European constitution should take "a clear, open, effective, democratically controlled Community approach." Their goal-that within the Union, "European institutions should be brought closer to its citizens"-raises many questions about implementation. What is the most effective procedure for connecting citizens' preferences to political action and policy choices at the EU level? The contributors to this CESifo volume, internationally prominent economists and other scholars, address the major issues that arise in the writing of a constitution. They do so with the underlying assumption that individuals are rational actors and the goal of the state is to advance their collective interests. The ten chapters consider such topics as how a constitution might be designed to prevent military conflict, whether the EU will evolve "by default" into a federal state, the apparent contradiction between the evolutionary development of the EU and the static structure of the constitution, the definition of citizenship and rights, the division and distribution of power, the budgetary deadlock on the provision of public goods and the redistribution of resources, coordinating policy, alternative methods for choosing an EU president, and the role of such direct democracy institutions as referenda and initiatives. The editors conclude by summing up the main arguments advanced to offer a unified sapproach to these issues.

by "Nielsen BookData"

Details

• NCID: BA68497822
• ISBN:
  • 0262025663
• LCCN: 2004042787
• Country Code: us
• Title Language Code: eng
• Text Language Code: eng
• Place of Publication: Cambridge, Mass.
• Pages/Volumes: xvi, 266 p.
• Size: 24 cm
• Classification:
  • LCC : KJE4445
  • DC22 : 342.402
• Subject Headings:
  • LCSH : European Union
  • LCSH : Constitutional law -- European Union countries
• Parent Bibliography ID:
  • BA62403327