Dynamic games : theory and applications
著者
書誌事項
Dynamic games : theory and applications
(GERAD 25th anniversary series, 10)
Springer, c2005
- : HB
大学図書館所蔵 全38件
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  京都
  大阪
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  奈良
  和歌山
  鳥取
  島根
  岡山
  広島
  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
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  韓国
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注記
Includes bibliographical references
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Dynamic games continue to attract strong interest from researchers interested in modelling competitive as well as conflict situations exhibiting an intertemporel aspect. Applications of dynamic games have proven to be a suitable methodology to study the behaviour of players (decision-makers) and to predict the outcome of such situations in many areas including engineering, economics, management science, military, biology and political science.
Dynamic Games: Theory and Applications collects thirteen articles written by established researchers. It is an excellent reference for researchers and graduate students covering a wide range of emerging and revisited problems in both cooperative and non-cooperative games in different areas of applications, especially in economics and management science.
目次
Foreword.- Contributing Authors.- Preface.- Dynamical Connectionist Network and Cooperative Games.- A Direct Method for Open-Loop Dynamic Games for Affine Control Systems.- Braess Paradox and Properties of Wardrop Equilibrium in some Multiservice Networks.- Production Games and Price Dynamics.- Consistent Conjectures, Equilibiria and Dynamic Games.- Cooperative Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information.- Electricity Prices in a Game Theory Context.- Efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot: A Two Stage Game.- Cheap Talk, Gullibility, and Welfare in an Environmental Taxation Game.- A Two-Timescale Stochastic Game Framework for Climate Change Policy Assessment.- A Differnetial Game of Advertising for National and Store Brands.- Incentive Strategies for Shelf-space Allocation in Duopolies.- Subgame Consistent Dormant-Firm Cartels.
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