The missing link in cognition : origins of self-reflective consciousness
著者
書誌事項
The missing link in cognition : origins of self-reflective consciousness
Oxford University Press, 2005
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注記
Includes bibliographical references and indexes
収録内容
- Episodic memory and autonoesis : uniquely human? / Endel Tulving
- Self-reflective consciousness and the projectable self / Janet Metcalfe & Hedy Kober
- Metacognition and the evolution of language / Herbert S. Terrace
- Emerging levels of consciousness in early human development / Katherine Nelson
- A continuum of self-consciousness that emerges in phylogeny and ontogeny / Marcel Kinsbourne
- Humans as applied motivation scientists : self-consciousness from "shared reality" and "becoming" / E. Tory Higgins
- Two normative roles for self-consciousness / Patricia Kitcher
- Progress in the study of chimpanzee recall and episodic memory / Charles Menzel
- Do nonhuman primates have episodic memory? / Bennett L. Schwartz
- Studies of uncertainty monitoring and metacognition in animals and humans / J. David Smith
- Can rhesus monkeys discriminate between remembering and forgetting? / Robert R. Hampton
- Metaconfidence judgments in rhesus macaques : explicit versus implicit mechanisms / Lisa K. Son & Nate Kornell
- The self and other : a missing link in comparative social cognition / Josep Call
内容説明・目次
内容説明
How do we develop self-awareness, or a sense of self? One of the most popular theories is that language plays a major role: language and the narrative form allow us to develop a sense of self because this sense is dependent upon representational thought and the psychological manipulation of representations. Some scholars argue against this theory, claiming that more than language and representational thought is needed. Comparing human and animal cognition is a
particularly powerful way of examining this disagreement; if animals possess self-awareness without having the representational linguistic capabilities of humans, then the comparison will provide significant evidence for the argument that language and narrative form do not play the only role, and that
researchers may have overlooked a cognitive link. Terrace and Metcalfe propose to facilitate this work of some participants, such as Endel Tulving, Janet Metcalfe, and Daniel Povinelli, shows that self-awareness, metacognitions, and representational thought are unique to humans, while that of precursors to self-aware thought processes exist in non-human primates, the debate is likely to be lively and informative. This volume will be of great interest to researchers in cognitive, developmental,
and social psychology.
目次
- 1. Episodic memory and autonoesis: Uniquely human?
- 2. Self-reflective consciousness and the projectable self
- 3. Metacognition and the evolution of language
- 4. Emerging levels of consciousness in early human development
- 5. A continuum of self-consciousness that emerges in phylogeny and ontogeny
- 6. Humans as applied motivation scientists: Self-consciousness from "Shared Reality" and "Becoming"
- 7. Two normative roles for self-consciousness
- 8. Progress in the study of chimpanzee recall and episodic memory
- 9. Do non-human primates have episodic memory
- 10. Studies of uncertainty monitoring and metacognition in animals and humans
- 11. Can Rhesus monkeys discriminate between remembering and forgetting?
- 12. Meta-confidence judgements in Rhesus Macaques: Explicit versus implicit mechanisms
- 13. The self and other: A missing link in comparative social cognition
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