Rationality, games, and strategic behaviour
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Rationality, games, and strategic behaviour
（Collected papers in theoretical economics / Kaushik Basu, v. 2）
Oxford University Press, c2005
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Note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
The rise of game theory around the middle of the twentieth century has profoundly affected the way economic theory is practiced. The present book is a collection of Kaushik Basu s papers on game theory and, more generally, strategic analysis. It includes papers in both pure and applied theory. In the theoretical papers the emphasis is more on the philosophical foundations of rational and strategic behaviour than on the mathematical basis of game theory. They deal
with questions like: Can social order be achieved entirely through the pursuit of selfish individual aims or are social norms and a commitment to some deontic principles necessary? What role does higher knowledge of interpersonal rationality play in guiding human behaviour? The applied papers range over
topics in the organization and modeling of government behaviour and topics in industrial organization theory, such as entry-deterrence, psychology and pricing and collusion and antitrust legislation.
Table of Contents
- 1. INTRODUCTION
- PART I. RATIONALITY AND SOCIAL NORMS
- 2. THE TRAVELLER S DILEMMA: PARADOXES OF RATIONALITY IN GAME THEORY
- 3. ON WHY WE DO NOT TRY TO WALK OFF WITHOUT PAYING AFTER A TAXI RIDE
- PART II. GAMES AND EQUILIBRIUM BEHAVIOUR
- 4. ON THE EXISTENCE OF A RATIONALITY DEFINITION FOR EXTENSIVE GAMES
- 5. STRATEGY SUBSETS CLOSED UNDER RATIONAL BEHAVIOUR
- 6. GROUP RATIONALITY, UTILITARIANISM, AND ESCHER S WATERFALL
- 7. INFORMATION AND STRATEGY IN THE ITERATED PRISONER S DILEMMA
- PART III. INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR
- 8. MONOPOLY, QUALITY UNCERTAINTY, AND STATUS GOODS
- 9. WHY MONOPOLISTS PREFER TO MAKE THEIR GOODS LESS DURABLE
- 10. ENTRY-DETERRENCE IN STACKELBERG PERFECT EQUILIBRIA
- 11. COLLUSION IN FINITELY REPEATED OLIGOPOLIES
- 12. STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM IN OLIGOPOLY: AN EXPLANATION BASED ON MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES
- 13. THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL CREDIT AS AN INSTRUMENT OF TRADE
- 14. WHY ARE SO MANY GOODS PRICED TO END IN NINE? AND WHY THIS PRACTICE HUR
- TS THE PRODUCERS
- PART IV. GOVERNMENT, GAMES AND THE LAW
- 15. NOTES ON BRIBERY AND THE CONTROL OF CORRUPTION
- A MODEL OF MONOPOLY WITH STRATEGIC GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
- 17. ON MISUNDERSTANDING GOVERNMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ART OF POLICY ADVICE
- 18. THE ECONOMICS AND LAW OF TENANCY RENT CONTROL
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