Deflationism and paradox
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Deflationism and paradox
Oxford University Press, 2005
- hbk.
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Note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
Deflationist accounts of truth are widely held in contemporary philosophy: they seek to show that truth is a dispensable concept with no metaphysical depth. However, logical paradoxes present problems for deflationists, which their work has struggled to overcome. In this volume of fourteen original essays, a distinguished team of contributors explore the extent to which, if at all, deflationism can accommodate paradox. The volume will be of interest to philosophers
of logic, philosophers of language, and anyone working on truth.
Table of Contents
- Introduction
- 1. Transparent disquotationalism
- 2. Is the Liar sentence both true and false?
- 3. Spiking the field artillery
- 4. Variations on a theme by Yablo
- 5. A minimalist critique of Tarski on truth
- 6. Minimalism, epistemicism, and paradox
- 7. Minimalists about truth can (and should) be epistemicists, and it helps if they are revision theorists too
- 8. Minimalism, deflationism, and paradoxes
- 9. Do the paradoxes pose a special problem for deflationism?
- 10. Semantics for deflationists
- 11. How significant is the Liar?
- 12. The deflationists' axioms for truth
- 13. Naive truth and sophisticated logic
- 14. Anaphorically unrestricted quantifiers and paradoxes
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