Consciousness and its objects
著者
書誌事項
Consciousness and its objects
Clarendon Press , Oxford University Press, 2006
- : pbk
大学図書館所蔵 全6件
注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
"First published in paperback 2006"--T.p. verso
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Colin McGinn presents his latest work on consciousness in ten interlinked essays, four of them previously unpublished. He extends and deepens his controversial solution to the mind-body problem, defending the view that consciousness is both ontologically unproblematic and epistemologically impenetrable. He also investigates the basis of our knowledge that there is a mind-body problem, and the bearing of this on attempted solutions. McGinn goes on to discuss the status of first-person authority, the possibility of atomism with respect to consciousness, extreme dualism, and the role of non-existent objects in constituting intentionality. He argues that traditional claims about our knowledge of our own mind and of the external world can be inverted; that atomism about the conscious mind might turn out to be true; that dualism is more credible the more extreme it is; and that all intentionality involves non-existent objects. These are all surprising positions, but he contends that what the philosophy of mind needs now is 'methodological radicalism' - a willingness to consider new and seemingly extravagant ideas.
目次
- Introduction
- 1. What Constitutes the Mind-Body Problem?
- 2. How Not to Solve the Mind-Body Problem
- 3. Solving the Philosophical Mind-Body Problem
- 4. What Is It Not Like to be a Brain?
- 5. Consciousness and Space
- 6. Consciousness, Atomism, and the Ancient Greeks
- 7. Consciousness and Cosmology: Hyperdualism Ventilated
- 8. The Problem of Philosophy
- 9. Inverted First-Person Authority
- 10. The Objects of Intentionality
「Nielsen BookData」 より