Democratic constitutional design and public policy : analysis and evidence

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Bibliographic Information

Democratic constitutional design and public policy : analysis and evidence

edited by Roger D. Congleton and Birgitta Swedenborg

MIT Press, c2006

  • : pbk
  • : hbk

Available at  / 14 libraries

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Note

Papers originally presented at a conference sponsored by the Center for Business and Policy Studies

Includes bibliographical references and index

Contents of Works

  • Introduction : rational choice politics and institutions / Roger D. Congleton and Birgitta Swedenborg
  • Direct democracy : designing a living constitution / Bruno S. Frey and Alois Stutzer
  • Constitutions and economic policy / Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini
  • Party-line voting and committee assignments in the mixed-member system / Thomas Stratmann
  • The effects of constitutions on coalition governments in parliamentary democracies / Daniel Diermeier, Hülya Eraslan, and Antonio Merlo
  • On the merits of bicameral legislatures : intragovernmental bargaining and policy stability / Roger D. Congleton
  • Bicameralism and political compromise in representative democracy / John Charles Bradbury and W. Mark Crain
  • Federalism : a constitutional perspective / Dennis C. Mueller
  • Common tax pool problems in federal systems / Brian Knight
  • Judicial independence and economic development / Lars P. Feld and Stefan Voigt
  • Constitutions and prosperity : the impact of legal and economic institutions on the wealth of nations / Randall G. Holcombe, Robert A. Lawson, and James D. Gwartney
  • Amendment procedures and constitutional stability / Bjørn Erik Rasch and Roger D. Congleton
  • Designing constitutional stability / Barry R. Weingast

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