Democratic constitutional design and public policy : analysis and evidence

著者

書誌事項

Democratic constitutional design and public policy : analysis and evidence

edited by Roger D. Congleton and Birgitta Swedenborg

MIT Press, c2006

  • : pbk
  • : hbk

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注記

Papers originally presented at a conference sponsored by the Center for Business and Policy Studies

Includes bibliographical references and index

収録内容

  • Introduction : rational choice politics and institutions / Roger D. Congleton and Birgitta Swedenborg
  • Direct democracy : designing a living constitution / Bruno S. Frey and Alois Stutzer
  • Constitutions and economic policy / Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini
  • Party-line voting and committee assignments in the mixed-member system / Thomas Stratmann
  • The effects of constitutions on coalition governments in parliamentary democracies / Daniel Diermeier, Hülya Eraslan, and Antonio Merlo
  • On the merits of bicameral legislatures : intragovernmental bargaining and policy stability / Roger D. Congleton
  • Bicameralism and political compromise in representative democracy / John Charles Bradbury and W. Mark Crain
  • Federalism : a constitutional perspective / Dennis C. Mueller
  • Common tax pool problems in federal systems / Brian Knight
  • Judicial independence and economic development / Lars P. Feld and Stefan Voigt
  • Constitutions and prosperity : the impact of legal and economic institutions on the wealth of nations / Randall G. Holcombe, Robert A. Lawson, and James D. Gwartney
  • Amendment procedures and constitutional stability / Bjørn Erik Rasch and Roger D. Congleton
  • Designing constitutional stability / Barry R. Weingast

内容説明・目次

内容説明

The variety of constitutional designs found in democratic governments has important effects on policy choices and outcomes. That is the conclusion reached in Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy, in which the constitutional procedures and constraints through which laws and public policies are adopted-election laws, the general architecture of government, the legal system, and methods for amendment and reform-are evaluated for their political and economic effects. Leading scholars, many of them pioneers in the new field of constitutional political economy, survey and extend recent empirical evidence on the policy effects of different constitutional procedures and restraints. Their findings are relevant not only to such dramatic changes as democratic transition throughout the world and the development of a European constitution but also to the continuing process of constitutional reform in established democracies. Using the tools of rational choice analysis, the contributors approach the question of constitutional design from public choice, new institutionalist, and new political economy perspectives. Drawing on empirical evidence largely from the OECD countries, the book analyzes such issues as the policy effects of direct (as opposed to representative) democracy, democratic accountability in presidential as compared to parliamentary government, bicameralism and its relation to stable policies, the relative effectiveness of centralized and decentralized governments, the civil and legal regulatory system as a nation's "economic constitution," and the link between constitutional stability and the amendment process. Contributors John C. Bradbury, Roger D. Congleton, W. Mark Crain, Daniel Diermeier, Lars Feld, Bruno Frey, James D. Gwartney, Randall Holcombe, Hulya Eraslan, Brian Knight, Robert A. Lawson Antonio Merlo, Dennis Mueller, Torsten Persson, Bjorn Erik Rasch, Thomas Stratmann, Alois Stutzer, Birgitta Swedenborg, Guido Tabellini, Stefan Voigt, Barry Weingast

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