The minimum means of reprisal : China's search for security in the nuclear age
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
The minimum means of reprisal : China's search for security in the nuclear age
（American Academy studies in global security）
American Academy of Arts and Sciences : MIT Press, c2007
- : pbk
- : hardcover
Available at / 13 libraries
-
Library, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization図
: pbkAECC||355||M516491466
-
No Libraries matched.
- Remove all filters.
Note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Description and Table of Contents
- Volume
-
: hardcover ISBN 9780262122849
Description
An analysis of China's nuclear and space capabilities, deployment strategies, and stance in arms control negotiations, and the implications for U.S. defense strategy.
In The Minimum Means of Reprisal, Jeffrey Lewis examines China's nuclear and space capabilities and deployment strategies, as well as the Chinese government's stance in arms control negotiations. Lewis finds that Chinese officials hold a "restrained view" about the role of nuclear weapons in national security and maintain a limited nuclear capacity sufficient to deter attack but not large enough for control of these weapons to be compromised.
The future of cooperative security arrangements in space will depend largely on the U.S.-Chinese relationship, and Lewis warns that changes in U.S. defense strategy, including the weaponization of space, could signal to China that its capabilities are not sufficient to deter the United States from the use of force. Such a shift could cause China to reconsider its use of restraint in nuclear strategy, further damaging the already weakened arms control regime and increasing the nuclear threat to the United States and the world.
- Volume
-
: pbk ISBN 9780262622028
Description
An analysis of China's nuclear and space capabilities, deployment strategies, and stance in arms control negotiations, and the implications for U.S. defense strategy.
InThe Minimum Means of Reprisal, Jeffrey Lewis examines China's nuclear and space capabilities and deployment strategies, as well as the Chinese government's stance in arms control negotiations. Lewis finds that Chinese officials hold a "restrained view" about the role of nuclear weapons in national security and maintain a limited nuclear capacity sufficient to deter attack but not large enough for control of these weapons to be compromised.
The future of cooperative security arrangements in space will depend largely on the U.S.-Chinese relationship, and Lewis warns that changes in U.S. defense strategy, including the weaponization of space, could signal to China that its capabilities are not sufficient to deter the United States from the use of force. Such a shift could cause China to reconsider its use of restraint in nuclear strategy, further damaging the already weakened arms control regime and increasing the nuclear threat to the United States and the world.
by "Nielsen BookData"