Votes, vetoes, and the political economy of international trade agreements
著者
書誌事項
Votes, vetoes, and the political economy of international trade agreements
Princeton University Press, c2012
- : hardcover : alk.
- : pbk
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注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. [179]-200) and index
収録内容
- Figures and tables
- Preface and acknowledgments
- Commonly used abbreviations
- Introduction
- A political economy theory of international trade agreements
- Systemic influences on PTA formation
- Regime type, veto players, and pta formation
- Auxiliary hypotheses about domestic politics and trade agreements
- Conclusions
- Bibliography
- Index
内容説明・目次
- 巻冊次
-
: hardcover : alk. ISBN 9780691135298
内容説明
Preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) play an increasingly prominent role in the global political economy, two notable examples being the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement. These agreements foster economic integration among member states by enhancing their access to one another's markets. Yet despite the importance of PTAs to international trade and world politics, until now little attention has been focused on why governments choose to join them and how governments design them. This book offers valuable new insights into the political economy of PTA formation. Many economists have argued that the roots of these agreements lie in the promise they hold for improving the welfare of member states. Others have posited that trade agreements are a response to global political conditions. Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner argue that domestic politics provide a crucial impetus to the decision by governments to enter trade pacts.
Drawing on this argument, they explain why democracies are more likely to enter PTAs than nondemocratic regimes, and why as the number of veto players - interest groups with the power to block policy change - increases in a prospective member state, the likelihood of the state entering a trade agreement is reduced. The book provides a novel view of the political foundations of trade agreements.
目次
List of Figures and Tables vii Preface and Acknowledgments ix Commonly Used Abbreviations xi Chapter 1: Introduction 1 What Are PTAs and Why Are They Important? 5 Economic Effects of PTAs 7 Political and Security Effects of PTAs 8 PTAs in Historical Perspective 9 The Effects of Domestic Politics on PTAs: The Argument in Brief 14 The Broader Theoretical Context 19 Organization of the Book 21 Chapter 2: A Political Economy Theory of International Trade Agreements 23 A Political Economy Theory of PTAs 24 Examining the Assumptions Underlying the Theory 30 An Alternative Argument about PTAs and Domestic Politics: The Role of Interest Groups 37 Regime Type, Domestic Political Costs, and PTAs 41 Two Cases of Democracy and PTA Formation: SADC and Mercosur 45 Veto Players, Transaction Costs, and PTAs 55 Some Illustrations of the Effects of Veto Players on PTA Formation 58 Further Effects of Domestic Politics on International Trade Agreements: Auxiliary Hypotheses 63 Conclusion 68 Chapter 3: Systemic Influences on PTA Formation 70 International Influences on PTA Formation 71 The Models and Estimation Procedures 77 Estimates of the Parameters 83 The GATT/WTO and PTA Formation 88 Conclusions 90 Chapter 4: Regime Type, Veto Players, and PTA Formation 93 Two Theoretical Propositions 93 Empirical Tests of the Hypotheses 96 Results of the Empirical Analysis 104 Robustness Checks 113 Conclusions 121 Chapter 5: Auxiliary Hypotheses about Domestic Politics and Trade Agreements 122 PTAs and the Longevity of Political Leaders 124 Partisanship and PTAs 128 Regime Type and Exposure to the International Economy 129 Autocracies, Political Competition, and PTAs 132 The Extent of Proposed Integration and Enforcement 137 Ratification Delay and Veto Players 145 Conclusions 151 Chapter 6: Conclusions 155 The Argument and Evidence in Brief 156 Some Implications for the Study of International Relations 161 PTAs and the World Economy 171 PTAs and the International Political Economy: Power and Politics 174 Bibliography 179 Index 201
- 巻冊次
-
: pbk ISBN 9780691135304
内容説明
Preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) play an increasingly prominent role in the global political economy, two notable examples being the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement. These agreements foster economic integration among member states by enhancing their access to one another's markets. Yet despite the importance of PTAs to international trade and world politics, until now little attention has been focused on why governments choose to join them and how governments design them. This book offers valuable new insights into the political economy of PTA formation. Many economists have argued that the roots of these agreements lie in the promise they hold for improving the welfare of member states. Others have posited that trade agreements are a response to global political conditions. Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner argue that domestic politics provide a crucial impetus to the decision by governments to enter trade pacts.
Drawing on this argument, they explain why democracies are more likely to enter PTAs than nondemocratic regimes, and why as the number of veto players--interest groups with the power to block policy change--increases in a prospective member state, the likelihood of the state entering a trade agreement is reduced. The book provides a novel view of the political foundations of trade agreements.
目次
List of Figures and Tables vii Preface and Acknowledgments ix Commonly Used Abbreviations xi Chapter 1: Introduction 1 What Are PTAs and Why Are They Important? 5 Economic Effects of PTAs 7 Political and Security Effects of PTAs 8 PTAs in Historical Perspective 9 The Effects of Domestic Politics on PTAs: The Argument in Brief 14 The Broader Theoretical Context 19 Organization of the Book 21 Chapter 2: A Political Economy Theory of International Trade Agreements 23 A Political Economy Theory of PTAs 24 Examining the Assumptions Underlying the Theory 30 An Alternative Argument about PTAs and Domestic Politics: The Role of Interest Groups 37 Regime Type, Domestic Political Costs, and PTAs 41 Two Cases of Democracy and PTA Formation: SADC and Mercosur 45 Veto Players, Transaction Costs, and PTAs 55 Some Illustrations of the Effects of Veto Players on PTA Formation 58 Further Effects of Domestic Politics on International Trade Agreements: Auxiliary Hypotheses 63 Conclusion 68 Chapter 3: Systemic Influences on PTA Formation 70 International Influences on PTA Formation 71 The Models and Estimation Procedures 77 Estimates of the Parameters 83 The GATT/WTO and PTA Formation 88 Conclusions 90 Chapter 4: Regime Type, Veto Players, and PTA Formation 93 Two Theoretical Propositions 93 Empirical Tests of the Hypotheses 96 Results of the Empirical Analysis 104 Robustness Checks 113 Conclusions 121 Chapter 5: Auxiliary Hypotheses about Domestic Politics and Trade Agreements 122 PTAs and the Longevity of Political Leaders 124 Partisanship and PTAs 128 Regime Type and Exposure to the International Economy 129 Autocracies, Political Competition, and PTAs 132 The Extent of Proposed Integration and Enforcement 137 Ratification Delay and Veto Players 145 Conclusions 151 Chapter 6: Conclusions 155 The Argument and Evidence in Brief 156 Some Implications for the Study of International Relations 161 PTAs and the World Economy 171 PTAs and the International Political Economy: Power and Politics 174 Bibliography 179 Index 201
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