Lying, misleading, and what is said : an exploration in philosophy of language and in ethics
著者
書誌事項
Lying, misleading, and what is said : an exploration in philosophy of language and in ethics
Oxford University Press, 2012
1st ed
- タイトル別名
-
Lying, misleading, & what is said
大学図書館所蔵 件 / 全6件
-
該当する所蔵館はありません
- すべての絞り込み条件を解除する
注記
Bibliography: p. [139]-143
Includes index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Many people (both philosophers and not) find it very natural to think that deceiving someone in a way that avoids lying-by merely misleading-is morally preferable to simply lying. Others think that this preference is deeply misguided. But all sides agree that there is a distinction. In Lying, Misleading, and What is Said, Jennifer Saul undertakes a close examination of the lying/misleading distinction. Saul begins by using this very intuitive distinction
to shed new light on entrenched debates in philosophy of language over notions like what is said. Next, she tackles the puzzling but widespread moral preference for misleading over lying, and arrives at a new view regarding the moral significance of the distinction. Finally, Saul draws her conclusions
together to examine a range of historically important and interesting cases, from a consideration of modern politicians to the early Jesuits.
目次
- 1. Lying
- 2. The Problem of What is Said
- 3. What is Said
- 4. Is Lying Worse than Merely Misleading?
- 5. Some Interesting Cases
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
「Nielsen BookData」 より