Precaution incentives in accident settings
著者
書誌事項
Precaution incentives in accident settings
（Gabler Edition Wissenschaft, Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts）
Gabler, 2008
注記
Originally presented as the author's thesis--Univ. Tübingen, 2008
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Tim Friehe analyzes important aspects for the design of tort law which intends to induce optimal individual choices and possible limitations of workable tort law in varied settings. He highlights the consequences of the consideration of hitherto neglected behavioral dimensions for the conclusions of the economic analysis of tort law.
目次
- The Economics of Tort Law: Basics and Selected Core Themes
- Incentive Effects of Damage Averaging in Tort Law
- Superiority of Damage Averaging in the Case of Strict Liability
- Screening Accident Victims
- Judgment Proofness and Risk Aversion
- Similarity of Bilateral Harm and Unilateral Harm with Role-Type Uncertainty
- Avoidance Activities after Accidents
「Nielsen BookData」 より