The failure of counterinsurgency : why hearts and minds are seldom won
著者
書誌事項
The failure of counterinsurgency : why hearts and minds are seldom won
(Praeger security international)
Praeger, an imprint of ABC-CLIO, c2013
大学図書館所蔵 全2件
  青森
  岩手
  宮城
  秋田
  山形
  福島
  茨城
  栃木
  群馬
  埼玉
  千葉
  東京
  神奈川
  新潟
  富山
  石川
  福井
  山梨
  長野
  岐阜
  静岡
  愛知
  三重
  滋賀
  京都
  大阪
  兵庫
  奈良
  和歌山
  鳥取
  島根
  岡山
  広島
  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
  宮崎
  鹿児島
  沖縄
  韓国
  中国
  タイ
  イギリス
  ドイツ
  スイス
  フランス
  ベルギー
  オランダ
  スウェーデン
  ノルウェー
  アメリカ
注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. [175]-179) and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
This book examines the implications of counterinsurgency warfare for U.S. defense policy and makes the compelling argument that the United States' default position on counterinsurgency wars should be to avoid them.
Given the unsatisfactory outcomes of the counterinsurgency (COIN) wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. military is now in a heated debate over whether wars involving COIN operations are worth fighting. This book provides a comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of COIN through key historic episodes and concludes that the answer is an emphatic "no," based on a dominant record of U.S. military or political failure, and inconsistency in the reasons for the rare cases of success. The author also examines the implications of his findings for U.S. foreign policy, defense policy, and future weapons procurement.
目次
1 Introduction: Quagmire: The Usual Outcome of Counterinsurgency Warfare
What Is an Insurgency?
Guerrillas Have the Advantage in COIN Wars
Guerrillas Not Winning the Support of the People Is Rare
Governments Disregard History and Continue to Jump into COIN Wars
2 When to Battle Insurgents
The Different Types of Guerrilla Wars
Losing COIN Both Militarily and Politically
Winning COIN Militarily, but Losing Politically
Losing COIN Militarily, but Winning a Larger Conflict
COIN War Ending in Negotiated Settlement or Concessions by COIN Forces
Closely Examining the Minority of Cases in which COIN Forces Won Both Militarily and Politically
Conclusion
3 Classic COIN Strategy
Scorched Earth Sometimes Succeeds
In the Modern World, a Classical COIN Strategy Is Probably Best
But COIN Doesn't Always Work
Insurgency More Cost Effective Than Counterinsurgency
A Classic COIN Strategy Requires More Forces Than Does Blasting Rebels
Conclusion
4 COIN and Compromise
Successful Episodes Involving Concessions or Compromise
Missed Opportunities
Conclusion
5 The Disadvantage of Foreign Occupiers
A Nationalist Reaction Against Foreign Occupation Can Make Revolt Potent
Nationalist-Based Insurgencies Are the Most Effective
Even Factionalized Nationalist Movements Can Win a Guerrilla War
Governments Can Occasionally Hold the Nationalist Card Vis-a-Vis Guerrillas
But It Doesn't Always Take Nationalist Movements to Win Guerrilla Wars
Guerrillas Have Advantages in Propaganda Use
Foreign Occupiers Are Rarely Given the Benefit of the Doubt by Locals
... And Some Local Guerrillas Can (Literally) Get Away with Murder
Foreign Occupiers Are Handicapped by Poor Knowledge of Local Conditions
If Foreign Forces Are Used Instead of Training Local Ones, Winning Is Problematical
The Advantage of Local Forces Compared to an Outsider
Conclusion
6 The Guerrilla Advantage
Despite Advances in Technology, Guerrillas Retain Advantages
Guerrillas May Try to Provoke COIN Forces into an Overreaction
Conclusion
7 COIN Forces' Advantages: Firepower, Numbers, and Technology
COIN Forces' Use of Excessive Firepower Often Backfires
Targeted Killings of Guerrilla Leaders May Backfire as a COIN Strategy
Scorched Earth Policies Can Sometimes Work
Sometimes Even Benevolent Policies Are Not Successful
Lack of Political Will Can Be a Problem in COIN
Expanding Indigenous Forces to Take Over Can Be Difficult
COIN Forces May Develop Tactical Innovations but Still Lose the War
Waging COIN Is a Difficult Balancing Act
Conclusion
8 Time Favors the Insurgents
Guerrillas Are Often in No Hurry
Some Insurgents Are Still Waiting
Trying to Win Too Quickly Can Hurt Insurgents
A Key Center of Gravity Is Public Support for the COIN War at Home
Foreign COIN Forces Are Challenged Because Their Time Is Likely Fleeting
Conclusion
9 COIN Wars: The Political Aspects
Local Governments Engaged in COIN Likely Already Suffer Legitimacy Problems
Military Organizations' Forte Is Not the Armed Social Work Needed for COIN
Instituting Democracy Is Often a Facade and Isn't Always a Plus for COIN Warfare
The Results of Even Fair Elections Are Not Always Predictable
COIN Often Unwisely Tries to Strengthen Local Central Government
Conclusion
10 The Guerrilla Win and External Support
Guerrillas Who Won Militarily or Politically Without External Aid
Even Without External Aid Some Rebels Persevere
Walls Can Be Effective in Keeping Out Aid and Fighters, But Not Permanently
Guerrillas Who Likely Could Have Won Without External Aid
Could Losers Win With External Assistance?
Assisting the Enemy
Conclusion
11 The United States and Politically Dominated Wars
Politics of Weapons Buying Stops Great Powers from Equipping for COIN
Conclusion
12 Prospects for Pending COIN Wars
U.S. Occupation of Iraq
U.S. Occupation of Afghanistan
Counterinsurgency From the Air: The Drone Wars in Yemen and Somalia
The General War on Terror
Conclusion
13 U.S. Track Record on COIN: Implications for Forces and Weapons
U.S. Vital Interests Do Not Usually Require COIN Warfare
What about the Unlikely Scenario of a Necessary COIN War?
Conclusion
14 The Domestic Effects of Overseas Counterinsurgency Wars
Vietnam War
The War on Terror
Conclusion
Bibliography
Index
About the Author
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