Equilibrium theory for cournot oligopolies and related games : essays in honour of Koji Okuguchi
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Bibliographic Information
Equilibrium theory for cournot oligopolies and related games : essays in honour of Koji Okuguchi
（Springer series in game theory）
Springer, c2016
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Includes bibliographical references
Description and Table of Contents
Description
This state-of-the-art collection of papers on the theory of Cournotian competition focuses on two main subjects: oligopolistic Cournot competition and contests. The contributors present various applications of the Cournotian Equilibrium Theory, addressing topics such as equilibrium existence and uniqueness, equilibrium structure, dynamic processes, coalitional behavior and welfare. Special emphasis is placed on the aggregative nature of the games that are relevant to such theory. This contributed volume was written to celebrate the 80th birthday of Prof. Koji Okuguchi, a pioneer in oligopoly theory.
Table of Contents
Introduction.- On the Works of Professor Koji Okuguchi.- Cournot, a
Non-strategic Economist.-Cournot Tatonnement in Aggregative Games with Monotone
Best Responses.- Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in Aggregative
Games: an Expository Treatment.- On the Geometric Structure of the Cournot
Equilibrium Set: the Case of Concave Industry Revenue and Convex Costs.- Pure
Strategy Equilibria in Finite Symmetric Concave Games and an Application to
Symmetric Discrete Cournot Games.- On a Discontinuous Cournot Oligopoly.-
Interpreting Markups in Spanish Manufacturing: the Exponential Model.-
Privatization Neutrality Theorem and Discriminatory Subsidy Policy.- Cournot
Oligopoly Theory for Simple Electricity Markets.- Kant-Nash Equilibria in a Quantity-Setting Oligopoly.-
Evolutionary
Oligopoly Models of Commercial Fishing with Heterogeneities.- Existence,
Uniqueness, and Comparative Statics in Contests.- Two-Group Contests with
Communication Within and Between Groups.- On the Nash Equilibrium of Asymmetric
Public-Good Contests.- Heterogeneity and Number of Players in Rent-Seeking,
Innovation, and Patent-Race Games.
by "Nielsen BookData"
