The economics of environmental monitoring and enforcement
著者
書誌事項
The economics of environmental monitoring and enforcement
（International library of environmental economics and policy）
Ashgate, c2003
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注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
This collection of papers addresses the neglected area of environmental monitoring and enforcement. The editor makes clear that this aspect of environmental economics has received scant attention by professionals formulating and implementing policy. Clifford Russell sees the origins of environmental monitoring and enforcement literature as coming from two major roots: the economics of "crime and punishment"; and the choice of policy instruments. His aims in organizing this collection of essays were: to give a feel for the development of the field of environmental monitoring and enforcement over time, and particularly how it expanded from its early ties into the instrument choice literature and yet how ties to the newest instruments-choice fashion, the provision of information, show up as well; to show the reader a fair sampling of the methods and models that have been adopted by the field's contributors; to suggest where some interesting problems and promising methods seem to lie in the year 2000.
目次
- Part 1 Optimality overall: the economic theory of public enforcement, Polinsky and Shavell
- the economics of enforcing air pollution controls, Downing and Watson
- firm behaviour under imperfectly enforceable pollution standards and taxes, Harford
- enforcement costs and the choice of policy instruments for controlling pollution, Malik. Part 2 Elaboration of themes - the design of penalties: the structure of penalties in environmental enforcement - an economic analysis, Segerson and Tietenberg
- guilty until proven innocent - regulation with costly and limited enforcement, Swierzbinski
- garbage recycling, and illicit burning or dumping, Fullerton and Kinnaman. Part 3 Self-reporting discharges: self-reporting of pollution and the firm's behaviour under imperfectly enforceable regulations, Harford
- self-reporting and the design of policies for regulating stochastic pollution, Malik. Part 4 Extensions of the basic template - using "ex-post" liability: firm behaviour and regulatory control of stochastic environmental wastes by probabilistic constraints, Beavis and Dobbs
- uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control, Segerson. Part 5 Using the regulatory record: cooperation, deterrence, and the ecology of regulatory enforcement, Scholz
- game models for structuring monitoring and enforcement systems, Russell
- an integrated strategy to reduce monitoring and enforcement costs, Hentschel and Randall. Part 6 Private and voluntary approaches: optimal standards with incomplete enforcement, Vicusi and Zeckhauser
- public mechanisms to support compliance to an environmental norm, Stranlund
- private enforcement of federal environmental law, Naysnerski and Tietenberg. Part 7 Empirical work - describing the M&E situation in the US: monitoring and enforcement, Russell
- environmental crime and punishment - legal/economic theory and empirical evidence on enforcement of federal environmental statutes. Part 8 Do monitoring and enforcement efforts make a difference?: effectiveness of the EPA's regulatory enforcement - the case of industrial effluent standards, Magat and Viscusi
- environmental inspections and emissions of the pulp and paper industry in Quebec
- the costs and benefits of oil spill prevention and enforcement, Cohen. Part 9 Cost and benefits of monitoring and enforcement: standard setting with incomplete enforcement revisited, Jones. Part 10 Explaining the behaviour of enforcement agencies: the revealed preferences of state EPAs - stringency, enforcement and substitution.
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