Repeated games and reputations : long-run relationships

著者

• Mailath, George Joseph
• Samuelson, Larry

書誌事項

Repeated games and reputations : long-run relationships

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

Oxford University Press, 2006

注記

Includes bibliographical references (p. 619-628) and index

内容説明・目次

内容説明

Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.

目次

1: Introduction PART I. Games with Perfect Monitoring 2: The Basic Structure of Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring 3: The Folk Theorem with Perfect Monitoring 4: How Long Is Forever? 5: Variations on the Game 6: Applications PART II. Games with (Imperfect) Public Monitoring 7: The Basic Structure of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 8: Bounding Perfect Public Equilibrium Payoffs 9: The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Monitoring 10: Private Strategies in Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 11: Applications PART III. Games with Private Monitoring 12: Private Monitoring 13: Almost Public Monitoring Games 14: Belief-Free Equilibria in Private Monitoring Games PART IV. Reputations 15: Reputations with Short-Lived Players 16: Reputations with Long-Lived Players 17: Finitely Repeated Games 18: Modeling Reputations

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詳細情報

• NII書誌ID(NCID): BA78449043
• ISBN:
  • 9780195300796
• LCCN: 2005049518
• 出版国コード: uk
• タイトル言語コード: eng
• 本文言語コード: eng
• 出版地: Oxford
• ページ数/冊数: xvi, 645 p.
• 大きさ: 26 cm
• 分類:
  • LCC : HB144
  • DC22 : 519.3
• 件名:
  • LCSH : Game theory
  • LCSH : Economics, Mathematical