The mechanisms of governance

Bibliographic Information

The mechanisms of governance

Oliver E. Williamson

Oxford University Press, c1996

  • : pbk

Available at  / 127 libraries

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Note

Includes bibliographical references (p. 381-410) and index

Date of another pbk. impression: "First issued as an Oxford University Press paperback, 1999" -- T. p. verso

Description and Table of Contents

Volume

ISBN 9780195078244

Description

New Institutional Economics is a new way to look at how organizations function. Rather than seeing the firm as a "black box", Williamson shows how decision makers respond to economic factors WITHIN the firm - what he calls "transaction cost economics" (TCE). In this series of studies, Williamson shows how complexity expands in organizations because of bounded rationality and opportunism; that is the "bad news" of his message. The "good news" is that individuals within organizations become perceptive of resulting hazards they may and do encounter, and are adept at fashioning their organizations to cope creatively with difficult situations. This creativity accounts for diversity among organizations, in which governance structures are adapted to firm - or industry-specific hazards.

Table of Contents

  • Prologue
  • PART I: OVERVIEW
  • 2. Chester Barnard and the Incipient Science of Organization
  • 3. Transaction Cost Economics
  • PART II: CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS
  • 4. Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Strucutural Alternatives
  • 5. Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange
  • 6. Economic Institutions: Spontaneous and Intentional Governance
  • 7. Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance
  • 8. The Politics and Economics of Redistribution and Inefficiency
  • PART III: ORGANIZATIONS
  • 9. Transaction Cost Economics and Organization Theory
  • 10. Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization
  • PART IV: PUBLIC POLICY
  • 11. Delimiting Antitrust
  • 12. Strategizing, Economizing, and Economic Organization
  • 13. The Institutions and Governance of Economic Development and Reform
  • PART V: CONTROVERSY AND PERSPECTIVES
  • 14. Transaction Cost Economics Meets Posnerian Law and Economics
  • 15. Transaction Cost Economics and the Evolving Science of Organization
  • Glossary
Volume

: pbk ISBN 9780195132601

Description

This book brings together in one place the work of one of our most respected economic theorists, on a field which he has played a large part in originating: the New Institutional Economics. Transaction cost economics, which studies the governance of contractual relations, is the branch of the New Institutional Economics with which Oliver Williamson is especially associated. Transaction cost economics takes issue with one of the fundamental building blocks in microeconomics: the theory of the firm. Whereas orthodox economics describes the firm in technological terms, as a production function, transaction cost economics describes the firm in organizational terms, as a governance structure. Alternative feasible forms of organization-firms, markets, hybrids, bureaus-are examined comparatively. The analytical action resides in the details of transactions and the mechanisms of governance. Transaction cost economics has had a pervasive influence on current economic thought about how and why institutions function as they do, and it has become a practical framework for research in organizations by representatives of a variety of disciplines. Through a transaction cost analysis, The Mechanisms of Governance shows how and why simple contracts give way to complex contracts and internal organization as the hazards of contracting build up. That complicates the study of economic organization, but a richer and more relevant theory of organization is the result. Many testable implications and lessons for public policy accrue to this framework. Applications of both kinds are numerous and growing. Written by one of the leading economic theorists of our time, The Mechanisms of Governance is sure to be an important work for years to come. It will be of interest to scholars and students of economics, organization, management, and law.

Table of Contents

  • Prologue
  • PART I: OVERVIEW
  • 2. Chester Barnard and the Incipient Science of Organization
  • 3. Transaction Cost Economics
  • PART II: CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS
  • 4. Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Strucutural Alternatives
  • 5. Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange
  • 6. Economic Institutions: Spontaneous and Intentional Governance
  • 7. Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance
  • 8. The Politics and Economics of Redistribution and Inefficiency
  • PART III: ORGANIZATIONS
  • 9. Transaction Cost Economics and Organization Theory
  • 10. Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization
  • PART IV: PUBLIC POLICY
  • 11. Delimiting Antitrust
  • 12. Strategizing, Economizing, and Economic Organization
  • 13. The Institutions and Governance of Economic Development and Reform
  • PART V: CONTROVERSY AND PERSPECTIVES
  • 14. Transaction Cost Economics Meets Posnerian Law and Economics
  • 15. Transaction Cost Economics and the Evolving Science of Organization
  • Glossary

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