Game theory : analysis of conflict
著者
書誌事項
Game theory : analysis of conflict
Harvard University Press, 1991
- : hbk
- : pbk
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注記
Bibliography: p. [539]-551
Includes index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Game theory deals with questions that are basic to all social sciences; it offers insight into any economic, political, or social situation that involves people with different goals or preferences. This book presents some of the most important models, solution concepts, and resutls of noncooperative and cooperative game theory, as well as the methodological principles that have guided the development of the fundamental models of game theory: games in extensive form and strategic form and Bayesian games with incomplete information. He defines Nash equilibria, sequential equilibria, and other equlibrium concepts and discusses their uses and limitations. He also covers incentive compatibility in games with communication, repeated games, two-person bargaining problems, cooperative solutions for coalitional games, and cooperation under uncertainty.
目次
- Part 1 Decision-theoretic foundations: game theory, rationality and intelligence
- basic concepts of decision theory
- axioms
- the expected-utility maximization theorem
- equivalent representations
- Bayesian conditional-probability systems
- limitations of the Bayesian model
- domination
- proofs of the domination theorems. Part 2 Basic models: games in extensive form
- strategic form and the normal representation
- equivalance of strategic-form games
- reduced normal representations
- elimination of dominated strategies
- multiagent representations
- common knowledge
- Bayesian games
- modelling games with incomplete information. Part 3 Equilibria of strategic-form games: domination and rationalizability
- Nash equilibrium
- computing Nash equilibria
- significance of Nash equilibria
- the focal-point effect
- the decision-analytic approach to games
- evolution, resistance and risk dominance
- two-person zero-sum games
- Bayesian equilibria
- purification of randomized strategies in equilibria
- auctions
- proof of existence of equilibrium
- infinite strategy sets. Part 4 Sequential equilibria of extensive-form games: mixed strategies and behavioural strategies
- equilibria in behavioural strategies
- sequential rationality at information states with positive probability
- consistent beliefs and sequential rationality at all information states
- computing sequential equilibria
- subgame-perfect equilibria
- games with perfect information
- adding chance events with small probability
- forward induction
- voting and binary agendas
- technical proofs. Part 5 Refinements of equilibrium in strategic form: perfect equilibria
- existence of perfect and sequential equilibria
- proper equilibria
- persistent equilibria
- stable sets of equilibria
- general properties
- conclusions. Part 6 Games with communication: contracts and correlated strategies
- correlated equilibria
- Bayesian games with communication
- Bayesian collective-choice problems and Bayesian bargaining problems
- trading problems with linear utility
- general participation constraints for Bayesian games with contracts
- sender-receiver games
- acceptable and predominant correlated equilibria
- communication in extensive-form and multistage games. Part 7 Repeated games: the repeated prisoner's dilemma
- a general model of repeated games
- stationary equilibria of repeated games with complete state information and discounting
- repeated games with standard information - examples
- general feasibility theorems for standard repeated games
- finitely repeated games and the role of initial doubt
- imperfect observability of moves
- repeated games in large decentralized groups
- repeated games with incomplete information
- continuous time
- evolutionary simulation of repeated games. (Part Contents)
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